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COMMENTS
IS GIFTING DEAD IN CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS? EXAMINING ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S NO-GIFT RULE IN IN RE DBSD
Michael Carnevale

INTRODUCTION
In the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization, a debtor in possession
historically has had a significant amount of flexibility in crafting a plan of
reorganization. During the recent reorganization of communications
company DBSD North America, Inc. (hereinafter “DBSD”), however, the
doctrine of gifting—which has at times lent itself to creativity on the part of
corporate debtors—was significantly restricted. The doctrine known as
“gifting” in the context of the Bankruptcy Code is one, which, in its
modern development, had evolved from a limited origin in 1993 to a more
expansive use over the following decade. Courts had frequently confirmed
plans of reorganization where creditors “in the money” voluntarily shared
some of their proceeds with those “out of the money” for various strategic
purposes. Some insist that this framework encourages creativity in
restructuring, while others characterize the practice as a method of shortcircuiting the seniority-based distribution scheme controlling bankruptcy
and diverting a debtor’s scarce available proceeds in violation of the
Bankruptcy Code. The practice had frequently been treated with approval
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by the bankruptcy courts, but now it has been largely gutted as a result of
the Second Circuit’s decision in Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD North
America, Inc. (In re DBSD),1 taken in combination with a Third Circuit
ruling from 2005 that also held improper the confirmation of a plan
involving gifting.2 The Second Circuit in DBSD overruled both the
bankruptcy court and the district court and applied a narrow interpretation
theory to the provision in the Bankruptcy Code often referred to as the
absolute priority rule.3
The Second Circuit’s decision raises some important questions about
the future of creative reorganization practices. This Comment takes the
position that the decision creates a circuit split that is not fully
acknowledged by the courts and, as such, is an important issue that should
be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. This Comment will argue that,
although the DBSD court appears to have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code
correctly, there are some difficulties with the Second Circuit’s reasoning.
Specifically, the court strained to avoid rejecting a prior First Circuit
approach,4 possibly to avoid explicitly declaring a circuit split. This
Comment will argue that, in reality, a split has developed between the First
Circuit and the Second and Third Circuits based on their recent decisions in
DBSD and Armstrong. The DBSD decision also calls into question what is
known as the “New Value Corollary,” which is a more frequently used
strategy than gifting in Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations. As a result of
the most recent decision, what remains is a confusing web of rules on
gifting that constitutes a circuit split in all but name.
The 2005 Armstrong decision appears to have carefully avoided
rejecting the First Circuit’s In re SPM Manufacturing Corp. decision. And
now the 2011 DBSD decision was careful to claim that its holding was in
harmony with both of those prior circuit decisions. Yet each of the three
opinions lays out a different approach to determining when gifting is or is
not appropriate, and each conflicts with the others in important ways. This
Comment will argue that gifting is a more problematic doctrine than new
value, both from a policy perspective and from a textual one. The
Comment will further argue that, should the Supreme Court agree to hear a
case involving the gifting doctrine, the meaning of the applicable statute in
the Code can be clarified, and the pall cast over the new value corollary
will be lifted. With the meaning of the code clear on both doctrines,
practitioners can then lobby Congress to amend the Code to allow gifting in

1.
2.
3.
4.

634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter DSBD].
In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012).
In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
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limited circumstances the next time the code is amended if they believe that
the doctrine is important enough to successful complex reorganizations.5
I.

THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF GIFTING

A. Early Origins
The propriety of what is currently termed “gifting” can be traced back
to Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,6 a 1913 Supreme Court case that
reined in creative reorganization practices. As a receivership bar grew in
the years leading up to Boyd, reorganizations, almost exclusively involving
railroads,7 had become increasingly complex and creative.8 In order to
address what was seen as collusion in railroad reorganizations, wherein
railroad owners often would retain control of an interest in the entity after
receivership proceedings, while some creditors would be excluded from
recovery, the judge-made “absolute priority rule” emerged.9 In Boyd,
5. During the final phase of preparation for publication, another student comment was
published discussing some of the material in this comment. See Lauren E. McDivitt,
Comment, What Do You Mean There Won’t be Gifts This Year?: Why Practitioners Cannot
Rely Upon Gifting Provisions in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans in the Fifth Circuit, 44
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1019 (2012). After tracing the history of the gifting doctrine through
DBSD, the author proposes that the Fifth Circuit may not approve of plans involving gifting.
Id. at 1039-45. The author arrives at this conclusion by analyzing two Fifth Circuit cases
that she finds instructive and also writes that the Fifth Circuit may find DBSD “more
persuasive” than prior cases from other circuits. Id. at 1044-45. Further, the author
suggests workarounds for practitioners where gifting might otherwise have been utilized.
Id. at 1045-50. This Comment, on the other hand, does not focus on the application of this
line of cases in any particular circuit. Instead, it proposes that a circuit split that has not
been fully acknowledged exists in this area of the law and suggests that the issue is ripe for
consideration by the Supreme Court. This Comment also observes how the DBSD ruling
might be interpreted to call into question another doctrine used at times by creative
practitioners, the new value doctrine. In conclusion, this Comment suggests a judicial
framework wherein these issues could be resolved in a manner that is both practical and
consistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.
6. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
7. See Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of
the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1927) (noting that as of 1916, over eighty
railroads were in receivership, representing about sixteen percent of the total rail mileage in
the United States).
8. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 66 (2001) (describing Boyd in detail and explaining why it was a “major judicial
setback” for receivership lawyers).
9. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 n.17 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that “[t]he absolute priority rule originated as a ‘judicial invention designed to
preclude the practice in railroad reorganizations of ‘squeezing out’ intermediate unsecured
creditors through collusion between secured creditors and stockholders (who were often the
same people.’”)) (quoting In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir.
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stockholders had been allowed to participate in the reorganization of the
Northern Pacific Railroad upon paying an assessment, while certain
unsecured creditors were excluded from the plan.10 This had become a
common practice, where shareholders would contribute capital to a
reorganized entity, yet existing unsecured creditors would be excluded.11
After the equity receivership court approved the plan, an unsecured creditor
sued the reorganized railroad on the theory that stockholders had received
an interest in the new company, while unsecured creditors were shut out,
violating the proper priority of distribution.12 By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme
Court held that a transfer by a bondholder—or in the parlance of Chapter
11 reorganizations, a secured creditor—to stockholders was invalid, and the
unsecured creditor could pursue its claim, even though the bondholder had
no obligation to make the transfer, and had to give up value that it had
rightful claim over in order to make the transfer.13 The court found that
“[a]ny device . . . whereby stockholders were preferred before the creditor
was invalid [under the Bankruptcy Act].”14 The “fair and equitable” rule
that came out of Boyd thus came to be a vertical test that ensures that
liquidation or reorganization proceeds are distributed in order of priority of
claims, and no creditors or classes of creditors are skipped in favor of more
junior creditors or equity holders.15 The Boyd rule became known as the
“fixed principle,” standing for the notion that equity was never to be paid
when debt was not first paid in full.16 But Boyd did not use the term
“absolute priority,” and it was not initially clear that such a rigid rule was
demanded. In the wake of Boyd, some practitioners, led by Robert Swaine,
a prominent reorganization lawyer of the time, argued that Boyd demanded
only “relative priorit[y].”17 Swaine predicted, ultimately incorrectly, that
future courts interpreting Boyd would only require that each class retaining

1995)); Skeel, supra note 8 at 56-59 (providing a history of the railroad equity receiverships
in the period leading up to Boyd).
10. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 504.
11. Skeel, supra note 8, at 67.
12. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 498.
13. Id. at 502.
14. Id. at 504.
15. See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939) (declaring that
the Boyd doctrine interpreting the term “fair and equitable,” found in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, is “firmly imbedded” in the Act).
16. See Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s
Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the
Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345,
1349 (2006) (describing the history of Boyd and noting that the rule that came out of it was
one requiring that equity must never be paid in a reorganization if creditors are not paid in
full).
17. Swaine, supra note 7, at 907.
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an interest in the reorganized entity retain its “relative position” in relation
to other security holders, which would not prevent offers to participate in
the reorganized entity from being extended to the various classes, so long
as the offers were fair given the position of each class.18 Swaine even
maintained that such a broad interpretation of Boyd as the one ultimately
taken would make “successful corporate reorganizations impossible,”
because equity holders are often the only source of new capital, and their
participation is often essential and frequently can only be obtained by
giving the stockholder something of value exceeding any new capital it
contributes.19 Partially in response to Swaine’s argument for a “relative”
priority rule, in a debate played out over the pages of the Columbia Law
Review, James C. Bonbright and Milton M. Bergerman termed Boyd’s
requirement an “absolute priority” rule.20 Bonbright and Bergerman saw a
danger in failing to impose a strict absolute priority test. They argued that
in railroad reorganizations, junior security holders consistently received
returns at the expense of senior security holders, even beyond the extent
necessary to raise new capital.21 In the end, it was the absolute rule that
won out in the courts.22 This common law rule was later codified in the
1978 Bankruptcy Code at § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which provides in relevant
part that “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claim or interest any property.”23 Under the enactment of the Code,
however, the absolute priority rule only took effect if an objecting class of
creditors existed.24

18. Id. at 907–08, 912. In essence, Swaine argued that equity still retained a going
concern value in a reorganization, which Boyd did not require be zeroed out, as in a
liquidation. Id.
19. Id. at 915.
20. James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of the Priority
Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130
(1928).
21. Id. at 144. Bonbright and Bergerman observed that courts in the wake of Boyd
tended not to upset a plan which was supported by a “substantial majority” of bondholders
just because it violated absolute priorities, as long as approximate relative priorities were
maintained. However, they called on the Supreme Court to require absolute priority if and
when the issue came before it. Id. at 155–56.
22. See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 107 (1939) (Supreme Court’s
adoption of absolute priority rule).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see also In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1128
(7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that § 1129(b) codified the absolute priority rule, although under
the Code a plan may be confirmed by the consent of the impaired classes pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §1126(c), which was an alteration of the common law rule).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
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B. SPM—The Origin of Gifting Under the Modern Bankruptcy Code
The origin of gifting under the modern Bankruptcy Code is generally
traced to the First Circuit’s decision in In re SPM Mfg. Corp.25 The debtor
in SPM originally filed in Chapter 11; however, the proceeding was later
converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation after difficulties confirming a
reorganization plan.26 In SPM, a perfected first-priority secured creditor
had a $9 million claim,27 while the debtor’s assets were only worth $5
million.28 Next in order came a tax claim that was a priority unsecured
claim, and that the owners of the debtor corporation were personally liable
for in the event it was not satisfied under the plan.29 In order to secure
cooperation of the unsecured creditors’ committee while the plan was still
in Chapter 11, the secured creditor agreed to share, on a sliding scale basis,
the proceeds of the eventual liquidation or reorganization with the class of
general unsecured creditors, but not satisfy the tax debt constituting the
priority unsecured claim.30 The agreement called for not only the satisfying
of the committee’s attorney’s costs and fees, but also a sharing of the
proceeds above and beyond such a carve out.31 After the plan was
converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor took a position against the
gifting, evidently because the owners of the family enterprise would
otherwise owe the priority unsecured debt personally.32 The unsecured
creditors’ committee argued that once the proceeds were distributed to the
sole creditor that was entitled to receive anything in liquidation, the funds
were no longer part of the estate and the creditor could do as it wished.33
The First Circuit agreed, overruling both the bankruptcy court and the
district court.34 A class that is “in the money” might want to share some of
its proceeds with a class that is “out of the money” in order to avoid
litigation, retain old management, secure cooperation, or achieve other
strategic goals. The First Circuit pointed out that just as the Code would
permit a priority creditor to voluntarily convey funds “to some or all of the
general, unsecured creditors after the bankruptcy proceedings finished,” so

25. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter SPM].
26. Id. at 1308.
27. In essence, this means that the creditor had the first right to any monies received by
the bankruptcy estate. This first-priority creditor was secured by a lien against substantially
all of the debtor’s property. Id.
28. Id. at 1307.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1308.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1313.
34. Id.
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could a secured creditor “enter into a contract during bankruptcy in which
it promises to do the same thing.”35 The First Circuit also held that the
distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code “does not come into play
until all valid liens on the property are satisfied,”36 and because the secured
claim absorbed all of the debtor’s assets, no one else had a claim of right to
those assets under the Bankruptcy Code.37
As might be expected, the SPM holding invited practitioners to test
how broadly courts might be willing to construe its reasoning, and in
general, creative restructuring agreements were met with success over the
following decade. As Daniel Bussel and Kenneth Klee put it, “SPM-ing
became all the rage” once Bankruptcy lawyers realized that courts were
allowing senior creditors to make deals with “junior juniors” without
providing for intervening classes.38 One decision confirmed a plan
involving “gifts” made directly from the estate by unsecured, rather than
secured, creditors in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization
confirmation: all circumstances differing from the SPM facts.39 Other
courts confirmed plans that involved gifting not to unsecured creditors, but
to equity.40 Gifting came to be seen by many practitioners as a way to
encourage creative deal making that increased overall value, and
discouraged holdout behavior.41 Parties “out of the money,” they reason,
will always object and litigate if possible, not because they were unfairly
circumvented and deprived of a legitimate claim, but to use the threats of
litigation and delay to extract value for themselves. Allowing these classes
to receive a consensual gift could serve to prevent such value-destroying
measures.42 Many of the subsequent cases broadening the doctrine cite in
support the reasoning of SPM that “creditors are generally free to do
whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including
to share them with other creditors.”43 As a failsafe, proponents of gifting
argue that the Best Interests Test ensures that a plan cannot be confirmed
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 663, 711 (2009).
39. In re MCorp Fin. Inc., 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
40. See, e.g., In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)
(confirming a plan that conveyed a gift to equity).
41. See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1349 (arguing that permitting gifting
furthers the policy objectives of Chapter 11).
42. For a detailed discussion of the history of the absolute priority rule and the gifting
doctrine, see id. at 1349-68.
43. SPM, 984 F.2d at 1313; see also In re Journal Register Co., 407 B.R. 520 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing SPM for the rule that creditors can do what they wish with
bankruptcy proceeds they receive).
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over the objection of a creditor that would receive less than it would have
in a liquidation proceeding.44 In any event, by the mid-2000’s, it was
becoming more common for shareholders to get a piece of the
reorganization pie, a trend that certainly included other phenomena besides
increased use of gifting.45 One practitioner credited the increase in
shareholder recoveries in the early part of the decade to “public outcry over
the way shareholders’ fates were dealt with” in some of the large Chapter
11 filings such as Enron.46
C. Armstrong case narrows the use of gifting.
In 2005, a circuit court visited the gifting doctrine for the first time
since SPM in In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.47 Armstrong rejected the
particular plan that had been confirmed by the bankruptcy court on the
grounds that the plan violated the plain language of the absolute priority
rule.48
Armstrong was characterized by some as a test on only the outer limits
of gifting. The proceeding involved an attempt by one class of unsecured
creditors to “cram down” another class of unsecured creditors and gift to
equity.49 Equity holders who wished to secure warrants in the reorganized
debtor reached an agreement with a class of personal injury claimants, who
were themselves anxious to get into the money. 50 The personal injury
claimants agreed to transfer warrants to the equity holder in the event that
another unsecured creditor rejected a previously proposed plan under which
the equity holders would obtain the warrants.51
The bankruptcy court approved the plan,52 but after the district court
overturned the confirmation,53 the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s
ruling that the plan violated the absolute priority rule as adopted by the
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (codifying the Best Interests Test in
Chapter 11); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(4) (codifying the test for Chapter 13 proceedings); Miller
& Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1374 (arguing that the “Best Interests Test” protects
creditors from the abusive uses of gifting that Boyd was concerned with preventing).
45. Lingling Wei, Holders Find Voice in Bankruptcies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2003, at
B4F.
46. Id. (quoting Edward Weisfelner of Brown Rudnick Berlack & Israels LLP).
47. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005).
48. Id. at 514. For a thorough history of the holding in Armstrong, see Miller &
Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1412–18.
49. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 509–10.
50. Id. at 509.
51. Id.
52. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 524 (D. Del.
2005).
53. Id.
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Bankruptcy Code.54 The Third Circuit was careful to distinguish its
holding from SPM, noting that since SPM involved a distribution under
Chapter 7, the absolute priority rule was not implicated.55 The court noted
that in SPM, the gifting party had a perfected security interest, thus making
the property free from subjection to distribution under the Code’s scheme,56
and that the SPM distribution was a “carve out.”57
II.

DBSD

As a Third Circuit decision, Armstrong was binding on the courts in
the District of Delaware, one of the most common forums for large
corporate bankruptcies.58 The other large forum, the Southern District of
New York, did not have a circuit opinion on the topic until DBSD came
along in 2011. In fact, the Second Circuit had avoided answering the
question just four years earlier,59 but took the issue head-on in the DBSD
case.
A. The Facts
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, DBSD had been a subsidiary of ICO
Global, which formed it to develop a mobile communications network
54. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 518.
55. Id. at 518. The Armstrong holding does not attempt to distinguish, however, the
fact that the gifting agreement in SPM was made while the case was still in Chapter 11, and
the SPM court clearly indicates it would have blessed the agreement even if it had stayed a
Chapter 11 case. See In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[W]e
cannot find support for appellees’ assertion that this agreement conflicts with any policy in
favor of reorganizations manifested by Chapter 11.”)
56. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514.
57. Id. Note that the Armstrong characterization of the SPM agreement as a “carve
out” is inconsistent with the common use of the term. The SPM plan called for payment of
proceeds net of administrative expenses to the unsecured creditors on a sliding scale,
starting at ten percent to the unsecured creditors for the first $3,000,000 of net proceeds.
SPM, 984 F.2d at 1308. But see Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002) (“As generally used, a carve out is an
agreement between a secured lender, on the one hand, and the trustee or debtor in
possession . . . on the other, providing that a portion of the secured creditor’s collateral may
be used to pay administrative expenses.”).
58. See ED FLYNN & GORDON BERMANT, BANKRUPTCY BY THE NUMBERS 3,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/abi_032002.pdf (last accessed
Nov. 28, 2012) (stating that over a recent six year period, of the 105 largest bankruptcies, 56
were filed in the District of Delaware, and 18 in the Southern District of New York, while
no other single district had more than 3).
59. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 460–61 (2d Cir. 2007) (declining
to decide whether SPM applied to Chapter 11 settlements because the case could be decided
on other grounds).
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using satellites and transmission towers.60 In May 2009, DBSD filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, listing $813 million in liabilities and $627 million
in assets.61 A first-priority creditor with a security interest in substantially
all of DBSD’s assets had a perfected lien in the amount of $40 million.62 A
second-priority creditor who also held a security interest in substantially all
of the debtor’s assets had a lien totaling $740 million at the time of filing.63
The combined amount owed to these two creditors plainly exceeded the
total assets of the company. Following just as plainly is the fact that had it
been a liquidation, these two secured creditors would have had the right to
take DBSD’s assets in their entirety, with nothing left over for unsecured
creditors or equity holders. These two, however, were not the only
creditors. Sprint Nextel had an unliquidated and unsecured claim that was
based upon a pending lawsuit.64
DBSD ultimately proposed a reorganization plan wherein the firstpriority creditor would receive new debt in the reorganized entity, and the
second-priority creditor would receive the majority of the common stock in
the reorganized company, worth between fifty-one and seventy-three
percent of its original claims.65 Under the proposed plan, Sprint would
receive equity worth four to forty-six percent of its original claim,66 and the
existing shareholder would receive approximately five percent of the equity
in the reorganized entity.67 Sprint objected to the confirmation of this
plan.68 Because Sprint was not entitled to recover from a liquidation
perspective, as the bankruptcy court pointed out, its recovery was “based,
ironically, on the gifting to which it object[ed].”69
B. The Holdings
Judge Gerber of the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New
York approved the plan over Sprint’s objection on absolute priority rule
60. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011).
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD I), 419 B.R. 179, 187-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
66. Id. at 188.
67. Id. at 187.
68. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011). Although
acceptance or rejection of a plan is administered on a class-by-class and not creditor-bycreditor basis, evidently Sprint’s claim made up a large enough portion of the unsecured
debt that Sprint’s vote was sufficient alone to cause the unsecured class to reject the plan.
Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “Inter-Class Gifting is
Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!,” 31 No. 4 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1 (Apr. 2011).
69. DBSD I, 419 B.R. at 215.
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grounds.70 Judge Gerber relied on SPM, pointing out that the gifting
doctrine permits senior creditors to convey to junior classes or interests part
of the distribution they would otherwise be entitled to.71 Noting
Armstrong, which he recognized that the Southern District of New York
was not bound by, he wrote that it distinguished rather than rejected SPM,
and that specifically, it only rejected gifting by unsecured creditors.72 He
suggested that the SPM court would have approved of the gifting scenario
involving DBSD, since in a case where secured creditors are doing the
gifting, the rationale in favor of the doctrine is stronger, since the creditor
has a property interest in that which it is gifting.73 The district court in turn
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding on the absolute priority rule issue,
finding Sprint’s appeal to be without merit in a short portion of its opinion
in which no cases were cited.74
The case next came up for appeal before the Second Circuit on three
issues, one of which was whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a secured
creditor in a Chapter 11 proceeding can “gift” some of its proceeds from a
reorganization plan to an equity holder, over the objection of a class of
unsecured creditors, when the unsecured creditors would have received
nothing under a pure liquidation dissolution.75 The Second Circuit
overturned the ruling of the bankruptcy court and district court, holding
that the DBSD plan violated the absolute priority rule.76 Although the
Second Circuit did heavily rely on Armstrong in reversing the order of
confirmation, unlike the Armstrong plan, this was a case of gifting from
secured credit to equity, and not from unsecured credit like in Armstrong.
Further, unlike Armstrong, no classes of the same priority as the “gifters”
objected, the only objectors being of a more junior class. While the
Armstrong iteration was arguably the first test of its kind, something like

70. Id.
71. Id. at 210-15.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id. at 211.
74. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., No. 09–cv–10156 (LAK), 2010 WL 1223109, at *4-6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010).
75. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011). Two other issues
were considered by the Second Circuit in the DBSD opinion. With respect to the second
issue, the court answered the question of whether Sprint had standing to appeal as the holder
of an indeterminate, unliquidated claim in the form of a pending lawsuit. The Second
Circuit held by a 2-1 vote that Sprint did indeed have standing to appeal. Id. at 85. The
third issue was whether the votes of DISH Network, a competitor who had purchased some
of the secured creditor’s claims for “strategic” reasons, had been properly designated and
disregarded by the bankruptcy court. On this issue, the court upheld the decision below,
holding that the designation of the votes was permissible. Id. at 104.
76. Id. at 85.
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DBSD had already been done, for example in the MCorp case.77 Therefore,
the Second Circuit needed either to explicitly reject SPM, or go beyond the
Armstrong logic in distinguishing SPM. The result, I would submit, was a
correct decision based on the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but reveals a
strained and confusing attempt to follow Armstrong and distinguish SPM.
The Second Circuit based its holding on a narrow interpretation of
absolute priority, tracing the history of the rule to its origins in connection
with the early railroad reorganizations leading up to Boyd, where
shareholders in the failed entities would often come away with capital
while junior creditors would take nothing.78 The court found that the shares
of DBSD were distributed “under the plan” and “on account of” its
previous interest, and were thus in violation of the absolute priority rule.
The first way in which the court distinguished SPM was on account of SPM
being based on a Chapter 7 proceeding, while the DBSD plan was a
Chapter 11 reorganization. The Second Circuit observed that the statutory
absolute priority rule applies in Chapter 11, but not in Chapter 7.79 SPM
was also distinguished because the court found that the gifted property in
SPM could have been be viewed as no longer part of the estate, since the
automatic stay had been lifted in SPM, while DBSD’s property remained
part of the estate all along.80 Up until this point, the Second Circuit’s
reasoning could be seen as closely tracking the Third Circuit in Armstrong.
However, beyond these similarities, there is some divergence between the
two holdings.
In rejecting the type of reasoning found in SPM’s progeny, the Second
Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its holdings on the new
value doctrine, another doctrine applying the absolute priority rule.81 The
DBSD court found that the Supreme Court had indicated a preference for
reading the absolute priority rule strictly.82 The court also pointed to
Congress’s codification of the absolute priority rule and observed that
Congress would have inserted a change, had it been their intention to
update the existing understanding of the absolute priority rule at the time of

77. See In re MCorp Fin., 160 B.R. 941, 964 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that in Chapter
11 liquidation proceedings, it would be permissible for junior creditors to be paid before
senior creditors, based on asset distribution plans that “accord with the expectations of the
statutes and the constraints of equity”).
78. DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 94.
79. Id. at 98.
80. Id.
81. For a discussion of the new value doctrine, see Skeel, supra note 8, at 233-35.
82. DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 97 (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S.
197 (1988)).
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the Code’s enactment.83 The court also examined the legislative history
leading up to the enactment of the Code, and quoting the House Committee
notes, observed that the “absolute priority rule was ‘designed to prevent a
senior class from giving up consideration to a junior class unless every
intermediate class consents, is paid in full, or is unimpaired.’”84 While the
circuit court noted the policy arguments for gifting, it also observed some
policy reasons that it said favor a strict interpretation, particularly an
incentive for “serious mischief between senior creditors and existing
shareholders.”85 The court did not anywhere attempt to distinguish
Armstrong’s heavy reliance on the fact that the gifting party in that case
was not a secured, perfected creditor with a property interest, which of
course was true of the gifting creditor in DBSD.
C. Analysis & Implications of the DBSD Holding
i.

Analysis

The first, and possibly most important, critique of the legal reasoning
in DBSD deals with its rationale for treating gifting differently in Chapter
11 than it would be treated in liquidations. This distinction provides
virtually the only plausible justification for the Second Circuit purporting
to accept both SPM and Armstrong, without rejecting one or the other, and
this Section will contend that the distinction is rather puzzling from a legal
standpoint. While it is correct that Section 1129(b)(2) only pertains to
Chapter 11 proceedings, the Code still provides a distribution scheme for
Chapter 7 proceedings, which lays out an order of distribution that is
essentially the exact scheme that the absolute priority rule seeks to enforce
even when a debtor’s assets are not in fact liquidated and distributed.86 The
opinion does not address the question of why Congress would want to
protect creditors in reorganizations, but not in liquidations. If anything,
creditors would seem to need more protection in liquidation proceedings
because of the finality of the matter. Here, with Sprint slated to receive
equity possibly worth up to nearly half of the value of its original claim, the
incentive is for everyone to maximize the value of the reorganized entity.
Further, in the Armstrong case, the Third Circuit laid out three main
avenues in which it distinguished the plan it was reviewing from the SPM
plan:
83. Id.
84. Id. at 100-01 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 416 (1977) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6372).
85. Id. at 100.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012).
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(1) SPM involved a distribution under Chapter 7, which did not
trigger 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); (2) the senior creditor had a
perfected security interest, meaning that the property was not
subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
scheme; and (3) the distribution was a “carve out,” a situation
where a party whose claim is secured by assets in the bankruptcy
estate allows a portion of its lien proceeds to be paid to others.87
If we were to apply this Armstrong test to the facts of DBSD, of the
three distinguishing factors, only the first could be said to be sufficient to
distinguish DBSD from SPM without rejecting SPM. Looking at the
second factor, DBSD’s creditor who provided the gifted consideration did
have a perfected security interest,88 and the distribution was similarly a
situation where a secured creditor allowed some of its proceeds to be paid
to others.89 Further, the SPM plan was not entirely a carve out in the usual
sense of the word, since it provided for recovery beyond administrative
expenses.90 Therefore, if the first of the three avenues—the difference
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11—was not found to be on solid legal
footing, the DBSD court’s attempt to distinguish its holding from SPM
would be on shaky ground indeed. And as discussed earlier, neither of the
circuit cases rejecting gifting have explained why it would be appropriate
to circumvent the distribution scheme in Section 726 of the Code in a
Chapter 7 proceeding, but not to circumvent the exact same order of
priority in Section 1129 in a Chapter 11 case. Further, like Armstrong, the
DBSD court makes no attempt to explain why the First Circuit gave the
SPM plan its full blessing even though it was conceived in Chapter 11.91 It
also implicitly rejects the reasoning in SPM, stating, “creditors are
generally free to do whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they
receive . . . .”92 Therefore, while the facts in Armstrong lent themselves to
the possibility of distinguishing the First Circuit’s SPM holding while
rejecting gifting in the Armstrong case itself, I would assert that DBSD
provides no convincing facts distinguishing its rejection of gifting from
SPM’s approval of the practice, thus creating a split between the two
circuits in all but name.
87. In re Armstrong, 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 2005).
88. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD I), 419 B.R. 179, 214 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
89. Id. at 186.
90. See Levin, supra note 57 (explaining that a “carve out” generally refers to money
set aside to pay for administrative expenses).
91. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 518; In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984
F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that “we cannot find support for appellees’
assertion that this agreement conflicts with any policy in favor of reorganizations manifested
by Chapter 11”).
92. In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993).
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There are also some important ways in which DBSD diverges from the
Second Circuit’s Armstrong reasoning, despite both courts rejecting gifting
in the context of a Chapter 11 plan. To the extent that the Armstrong court
held that the claim of a senior creditor with a perfected security interest is
“not subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
scheme,”93 DBSD rejects this analysis, as it holds that such a creditor is
indeed subject to the priority scheme. Here one can see already where the
Second Circuit’s attempts to avoid declaring a circuit split and square its
holding with the two prior circuit decisions are coming apart.
Another potentially troubling product of the DBSD holding is the
court’s reliance on two United States Supreme Court cases that it concludes
“indicate a preference for reading the [absolute priority] rule strictly.”94
While this logic gives the Second Circuit a precedential hook for its
holding, I would argue that it was not necessary and problematically calls
the new value corollary into question. Acknowledging that the two
Supreme Court cases did not address the scenario before it, the DBSD court
asserts that the Supreme Court’s “two post-Code cases on the rule are
instructive. In both cases, the prior owners tried to avoid the absolute
priority rule by arguing that they received distributions not on account of
their prior interests but rather on account of the new value that they would
contribute to the entity,” going on to note that in both cases, the Supreme
Court rejected those arguments.95 In examining 203 N. LaSalle, one would
be hard-pressed to find a general preference for strict interpretation. In that
case, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on the general validity of
a “new value” corollary to the absolute priority rule.96 The “new value”
corollary, the logic goes, allows a distribution to equity holders in a
Chapter 11 case, not on account of their previous status as owners, but on
account of “new value” being contributed to the reorganization.97 Like the
gifting doctrine, there is no reference in the 1978 Code to an exception for
new value. However, the 203 N. LaSalle court noted that although there is
“no literal reference to new value” in the statute, it did “nothing to
disparage the possibility apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute
priority rule . . . may carry a new value corollary.”98 While the Court did
not rule on this issue, these words certainly appear to portray it as open to

93. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514.
94. DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 97 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings
Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 437 (1999) [hereinafter 203 N. LaSalle]
and Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).
95. Id.
96. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449.
97. Id. at 443.
98. Id. at 449.
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the possibility of reading a doctrine into Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that is
not contained in the text of the statute—certainly not a general preference
for strict interpretation of the statute. Instead, the Supreme Court
adjudicated the case by determining what the phrase “on account of” within
the statute means, considering three possible interpretations.99 In fact,
although the Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle did not reach the validity of
new value, it did recognize a procedural safeguard built into the new value
doctrine—the requirement that the new value contributed be “reasonably
equivalent” to property received in a reorganization.100
Considering the second Supreme Court case, Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers,101 which preceded 203 N. LaSalle by ten years, we
find similar language in dicta by the Court, where it stated that it did not
wish to “comment on the continuing vitality of the . . . [New Value]
exception.”102 The Court held that even if the new value exception did
apply, it was not met by the parties in the case—farmers who retained an
equity stake in their farm in return for their labor and expertise. The Court
held that these factors would not count as measureable value.103 Although
the Ahlers court may not have read the applicable statute as liberally as
some practitioners would have liked, affirming the vitality of new value, it
again seems a stretch to proclaim that Ahlers stands for strict interpretation
of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). In fact, some have opined that the Ahlers
court failed to take a strict textualist approach to the Code, considering that
it passed on the opportunity to hold invalid a doctrine that is nowhere stated
in the statute.104 By declaring that the two Supreme Court decisions on
99. Id. at 450-51. For a more thorough discussion of 203 N. LaSalle, see Bruce A.
Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy: Some Initial Musings on the Ultimate Impact of Bank
of America, NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 345
(2000).
100. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 443, 445.
101. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
102. Id. at 203-04 n.3.
103. Id. at 203-06. Inexplicably, the Second Circuit pointed out that the “continued
cooperation and assistance” the existing shareholder of DBSD would contribute to the
reorganized entity sounded a lot like the labor and expertise that was rejected as constituting
new value by the Supreme Court in Ahlers. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d
79, 96 (2d Cir. 2011). I describe this as inexplicable because since a new value exception
was not sought, the debtor neither claimed to or needed to offer anything of value to in order
to satisfy § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) under the doctrine it sought to use in seeking confirmation.
104. See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV.
963, 1009-11 (1989) (explaining the Solicitor General’s arguments (as Amicus Curiae) in
Ahlers that the new value doctrine should be rejected and contending that, first, there had
never been an adequate doctrinal basis for the new value exception, and alternatively, that
the rule had been abolished by the Bankruptcy Code. The author argues that despite the
plausibility of these arguments and what he called the “evanescent” nature of the new value
exception, the Supreme Court declined to take a strict interpretation of the Code, as it could
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Section 1129 indicate a general preference for strict interpretation, the
DBSD court unnecessarily invites future courts to open the door to question
the ongoing validity of new value in reorganizations.
In the end, while the DBSD court may have had difficulty trying to
reconcile its holding with those found in SPM and Armstrong and
grounding it in Supreme Court precedent, the reality is the plan that the
Boyd court rejected almost a century ago was in some respects similar to
the proposed plan in DBSD. In fact, the debtor in Boyd used the argument
that since “there was nothing which could come to the unsecured creditors”
because secured debts were undercapitalized, that “they, therefore, had no
ground to complain if the bondholders were willing to give new shares to
the old stockholders.”105 This argument bears a striking resemblance to that
used by the DBSD Bankruptcy Judge, who held that:
[I]f the secured creditor class is undersecured, that will mean, at
least in most cases (as it does here), that any complaining creditor
would get nothing anyway, whether or not the gift had been
made—making it difficult, if not impossible, to see how the
complaining creditor can be legitimately aggrieved by the gift.106
So, if Boyd is indeed still good law, then it would follow that the
bankruptcy court did err in confirming DBSD’s reorganization plan, by
using the same logic that was dismissed in Boyd. When Congress enacted
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it effectually codified the “fixed principle”
from Boyd without any pertinent modification, thereby indicating an
approval of the existing state of the doctrine, of which Boyd was a crucial
part.107
Furthermore, the Second Circuit makes a compelling argument as to
the intention of the framers of Section 1129 when it analyzes the House and
Senate committee notes in support of a rule against gifting.108 The logical

have done by holding that no new value exception existed).
105. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 505 (1913).
106. DBSD I, 419 B.R. 179, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
107. Congress did, in fact, change one aspect of the absolute priority rule when writing
it into the Bankruptcy code. Under Boyd, a reorganization could not be confirmed in
violation of the “fixed principle” even if all parties consented. Under the 1978 Code, a class
must object in order for a violation to exist. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (maintaining
that a class must object in order for a violation to exist) with Boyd, 228 U.S. at 507 (holding
that a reorganization could not be confirmed in violation of “the fixed principle” even if all
parties consented).
108. See DBSD II, 634 F.3d 79, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing a House Committee report
referring to an earlier version of the bill which eventually became Section 1129(b)(2) with
only minor stylistic changes, indicating that the rule was “designed to prevent a senior class
from giving up consideration to a junior class unless every intermediate class consents, is
paid in full, or is unimpaired.”) (citation omitted).
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question that follows is what the practical implications of the holding will
be, and whether the concerns that were behind the Boyd decision are still
present today as a reason for justifying the rule.
ii.

Implications of the Holding.

The only two circuits that have considered the gifting doctrine since
SPM are the Second and the Third. As both have rejected gifting in the
cases before them, firms representing parties in bankruptcies in these
circuits need to find other ways to advise their clients to reach consensus
where gifting might have previously been viable. As these two circuits
have in their jurisdiction the two largest forums for complex corporate
reorganizations—the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New
York109—the disapproval of the practice is likely to have more effect than
the holdings of two circuits might in another area of the law. It is likely
that as future Chapter 11 filings arise, the new narrower interpretation of
the absolute priority rule will restrict the parties’ abilities to explore certain
types of compromises in complex reorganization attempts. As an example,
the Worldcom bankruptcy (confirmed prior to both the Armstrong and
DBSD holdings) was recently declared the third-largest bankruptcy of all
time, and at the time of its filing, was the largest.110 Use of the gifting
doctrine was one of the mechanisms implemented during that colossal
reorganization.
The bankruptcy court reviewing Worldcom’s plan
summarily held that “enhanced value received by holders of [unsecured]
claims on account of contributions from other Classes is not a treatment of
these Claims under the plan and does not constitute unfair
discrimination.”111 Without a detailed discussion, the court further stated
that “[c]reditors are generally free to do whatever they wish with the
bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing them with other
creditors.”112 The change in the state of the law in the eight years between
Worldcom and DBSD is striking, as it is unlikely any bankruptcy court in
any circuit today could summarily approve a plan including gifting as it did
in Worldcom, without at least some effort to distinguish DBSD and
Armstrong. While in Worldcom the gifting was from one class of creditors

109. Bankruptcy by the Numbers, supra note 58.
110. Shira Ovide, MF Global: Likely among the 10 biggest bankruptcies ever, WSJ
BLOGS (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31/mf-global-likelyamong-the-10-biggest-bankruptcies-ever/.
111. In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *60 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (citing SPM, 984 F.2d 1305 and MCorp, 160 B.R. 941) [hereinafter
Worldcom].
112. Id. at *61.
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to a more junior class, it is highly likely that applying the current
interpretation of the absolute priority rule governing the Second Circuit,
this plan of reorganization could have been rejected.113
Prior to DBSD, it was thought that gifting was more controversial
when coming from unsecured creditors. The main case disapproving of
gifting—Armstrong—spent a considerable amount of time explaining why
courts should be more wary in this situation than if secured creditors were
giving up part of their recoveries. However, DBSD took Armstrong a step
further, in disapproving of gifting by a secured creditor—one with a
property interest in that which is being gifted. As a result, advisors in any
jurisdiction must consider the possibility that bankruptcy and district courts
will follow the Armstrong and DBSD rulings. The limits on acceptable
parameters within a plan will result in practitioners working around these
issues at an earlier stage in bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the ruling
has the potential to be a game changer, at least in certain Chapter 11 cases.
It is also easy to see how an attack could be formed on the new value
corollary using the same logic that the DBSD court expounded. Just as
gifting is found nowhere in the 1978 Code, the new value corollary also is
not codified. Ahlers and 203 N. LaSalle refused to affirm the existence of
the new value corollary, so critics of the decision will point out that it
invites parties to the next Chapter 11 filing who want to hold off
confirmation to argue that the new value exception is also not within the
plain meaning of the Code. The one difference, of course, is that prior to
the enactment of the Code, the Supreme Court had arguably held in favor
of a new value exception in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co.114 However,
the last time that it took a case on the absolute priority rule, the Supreme
Court observed that the vitality of new value based on this reasoning is far
from clear. First, it pointed out that the concept of new value “never rose
above the technical level of dictum in any opinion of this Court.”115 The
Supreme Court went on to observe that Congress could have included a
provision in the Code that would allow exceptions for contributions of new
value, but chose not to do so, despite debating several proposed revisions to
the absolute priority rule.116 Therefore, there is no clear answer to this
question. One side will argue that Los Angeles Lumber sanctioned the new

113. See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1398-1405 for a detailed discussion of
the Worldcom plan. Miller and Berkovich, ardent proponents of gifting, acknowledge that
Worldcom arguably took the gifting doctrine too far even before the cases reining in the
practice. Id. at 1404.
114. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
115. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 445
(1999).
116. Id. at 446–47.
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value doctrine, and Congress took the state of the law as it found it when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Code. However, the response, which is solidified
by the plain meaning approach that DBSD takes, is that Congress would
have simply codified the new value doctrine if they intended it to be a valid
exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule, just as they changed the
rule to allow confirmation of plans with no objecting classes as discussed
earlier. Whether a new value corollary or exception is necessary or
valuable is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, suffice it to say
that many academics and practitioners have commented on its importance
and observed that complex reorganizations would often become far more
difficult to effect without it.117 Many agree with the policy rationale that
the Los Angeles Lumber court itself recognized, which is that allowing
existing equity holders to contribute capital is an important consideration as
they may be the best source of cash for a reorganization.118
The current state of gifting under DBSD results in a partial shift in
leverage from equity holders to out-of-the-money, unsecured creditors. As
the Second Circuit recognized, Sprint did not object to the plan because it
was unhappy with the amount it was receiving. Indeed, if all efforts to
reorganize failed and DBSD had been liquidated, Sprint would have
received nothing. Most unsecured creditors in this position object for
leveraging or strategic purposes. Indeed, Sprint may have wanted to use its
leverage to increase its share in the reorganized entity.119 The Second
Circuit holding thus shifts some of the power to hold up a reorganization
plan away from shareholders to creditors. This power may diverge at times
from a maximum-recovery standard. As the bankruptcy court pointed out,
Sprint would have done considerably better under the plan it opposed than

117. See David R. Kuney & Timothy R. Epp, Aftermath of Bonner Mall: Evolution or
Regression in the Notion of “New Value”?, 5 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 211 (1996) (arguing that
the new value doctrine as an exception to absolute priority is critical to the practice of
bankruptcy law and reorganization); Charles W. Adams, New Capital for Bankruptcy
Reorganizations: It’s the Amount that Counts, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (1995) (arguing that
reorganizations have historically been more efficient when shareholders provide new capital
in a reorganization, and discussing problems with turning creditors into owners); Miller &
Berkovich, supra note 16, (arguing that the new value should be recognized); Elizabeth
Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9 (making the case that
new value is permitted under the Code, and is incorrectly called an “exception” because its
use does not violate the absolute priority rule to begin with if old equity’s participation is
not on account of its former equity interest). But See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions,
and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991) (arguing
that the new value corollary or exception unfairly impairs the rights of unpaid creditors in
favor of debtor control, has no justification under the Bankruptcy Code, and should be
rejected).
118. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939).
119. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2011).
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it had a right to do from a liquidation standpoint. The Second Circuit,
however, was clear to emphasize that whether the plan was in Sprint’s best
interests was not relevant—the court clearly thought that it should be left to
Sprint to object to the plan if it believed the plan was not in its best
interests, whether that was a good business decision or not. Sprint’s
opposition, despite its potential considerable recovery as an “out-of-themoney” unsecured creditor, shows that its objective was likely bargaining
leverage.
The recent developments restricting gifting arguably serve to balance
the power during reorganization, rather than redistribute it all to creditors.
After all, equity holders are not without their own leverage in
reorganizations, even without the ability to make a deal with secured
creditors involving gifts. For example, equity holders sometimes have the
ability to compel a shareholder meeting for the strategic purpose of electing
a new board during reorganization proceedings.120 Furthermore, if
shareholders perceive that they will walk away empty-handed, they can
threaten to proceed with costly valuation rather than propose a plan in
which they take nothing.121 In addition, during the first 120 days after
filing, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose reorganization plans, a
power that can be extended to as long as eighteen months.122 In a case
survey, Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford found that extensions beyond
the 120 days are granted quite routinely.123 And if each class agrees to a
plan, it will be confirmed, even if it results in a distribution to the “old”
equity holder. Since equity holders have a number of sources of leverage
even without the ability to “cram-down” a plan involving gifting, perhaps
the better balance of bargaining power is to allow unsecured creditors the
bargaining chip of being able to object to a plan, such as the one proposed
by DBSD here.
As future bankruptcy cases arise, the DBSD holding will no doubt
spur creativity on the part of practitioners, as restrictive holdings tend to
do. Interestingly, one debtor sought to confirm a plan involving such a
creative “gift” shortly prior to DBSD. In In re Journal Register Co., a
120. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the
right to call a shareholders meeting continues with a debtor-in-possession during
reorganization). But see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram
Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 635 (1991) (explaining that in certain situations, former
equity holders can no longer call shareholder meetings during Chapter 11).
121. See Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125
(1990) (explaining that parties often compromise their interests so as to avoid the time and
expense involved in valuation).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012).
123. Lopucki & Whitford, supra note 121, at 128.
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bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York approved a Chapter
11 plan in which a distribution was voluntarily diverted from secured
creditors to trade creditors to ensure goodwill.124 The plan carefully
stipulated that it be placed in a “so-called trade account” that was explicitly
designated not to be property of the debtors.125 It will be interesting to see
whether such a method of short-circuiting the no-gifting rule in the Second
Circuit would be successful if tested after DBSD, although it would seem
unlikely.
IV. THINKING AHEAD TO A SUPREME COURT RULING ON THE MATTER
A. Why the Issue is Ripe for Supreme Court Adjudication
The last time the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an absolute
priority case, a similar circuit split had developed.126 The time before that
was in Ahlers, where although no circuit split existed, the case had been
heard by the Eighth Circuit and there was a vigorous dissent.127 Neither of
those cases resolved the issue of whether a new value corollary exists postenactment of the Bankruptcy Code. This issue, on the other hand, would
be a good opportunity to eliminate confusion over which principles taken
from the complex and often contradictory framework of First, Second, and
Third Circuit cases on absolute priority discussed in this Comment are to
be applied in future bankruptcies. Additionally, because the two prior
Supreme Court cases did little to provide rules to apply in future filings, the
Supreme Court could take advantage of this opportunity to lay down a clear
rule. In addition, while the Court would not likely be able to rule on new
value at the same time as gifting, it would be possible to dismiss gifting
using reasoning that could not be applied to militate against new value, in
contrast to the Second Circuit’s recent decision.128

124. In re Journal Register Co, 407 B.R. 520, 527 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2009).
125. Id.
126. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
443 (1999) (detailing the circuit splits between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and the
Second and Fourth Circuits).
127. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (Gibson, J. Dissenting).
128. Following the Second Circuit’s decision, DBSD pursued a sale rather than a new
plan proposal, and evidently chose not to pursue a petition for certiorari. DISH Network
Corp. agreed to acquire the debtor out of bankruptcy several months after the decision was
announced by the Second Circuit, and the sale was approved by the FCC in March 2012.
Joseph Checkler, Judge Says DBSD Can Move Forward With Sale to Dish Newtork, Dow
Jones News Service, Mar. 15, 2011; Anton Troianovski and Amy Schatz, Corporate News:
FCC Deals a Setback to Dish’s Wireless Network Plans, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 2012, at B3.
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B. Why the Court Should Reject Gifting, While Distinguishing New
Value
The arguments in favor of gifting are significantly weaker than those
in favor of new value, from both a policy and a doctrinal perspective.
Should the Supreme Court accept this case or a future one involving the
gifting doctrine, the Court would thus do well to be mindful that the
specific reasoning relied upon may well influence the vitality of new value.
After all, the DBSD court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s past new
value decisions to invalidate gifting.129 Since new value is a doctrine that
the Bankruptcy Bar has long relied on, and academics, practitioners, and
even the Supreme Court have recognized the importance of raising new
capital from existing shareholders, the Supreme Court should be wary of
chipping away at this doctrine.130 Further, the new value rule has an
important safeguard to prevent abuse—the value received must be
“reasonably equivalent” to new capital contributed, which ensures that
existing shareholders do not use the rule as an end run around the absolute
priority rule.131 Without a comparable safeguard in the gifting context,
courts have reason for concern that gifting could be used in nefarious
manners, even if the parties in DBSD had no such intent. Indeed, the
Second Circuit warned about “serious mischief” should this type of gifting
arrangement be sanctioned by the courts.132 Presumably, the court was
worried because the old equity holder who is on the receiving end of the
five percent “gift” is the same entity that is crafting the reorganization plan.
Perhaps the court was concerned that although the unsecured debtholder
was not injured here, in some other case, the plan proponent might
conveniently inflate the amount of a creditor’s priority claim when crafting
the plan in exchange for a generous “gift.”133
In developing the legal reasoning, the legislative history approach that
the DBSD court mentioned in passing would be a good place to start. The
House and Senate committee notes preceding the adoption of the
Bankruptcy Code could be weighed in formulating a rule in a way that
would properly dismiss the gifting doctrine as used over the past two
129. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d Cir. 2011).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 113–17 (providing examples of academic
support for raising new capital from shareholders).
131. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 442-45 (1999).
132. DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 100.
133. But see Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1408-12 (describing what would
likely be the practitioners’ rejoinder to the concerns about mischief—citing cases in which
Bankruptcy courts have rejected plans in which gifting was used for nefarious or improper
ends, such as In re Scott Cable Comm’s Inc., 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) and In
re Goffena, 175 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994)).
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decades, while clearly signaling that the new value doctrine is not in
question. As briefly discussed in DBSD, the Congressional Commission
assigned to make recommendations pertaining to the Code suggested
allowing equity owners to retain an interest if they would contribute
something essential, such as expertise, to the business.134 However,
Congress decided not to create an exception for gifts, although they did
make some changes to the existing framework, such as only allowing
classes of creditors, rather than individual creditors, to invoke the rule.135
But the story is not exactly the same when one ponders the legislative
history with a mind toward the new value corollary. The very fact that the
Bankruptcy Commission, in trying to make absolute priority more fluid,
considered changing the rule to allow non-monetary new value
contributions appears to indicate that they never even considered the
possibility that monetary contributions would not be permitted. In fact, a
proposed bill containing non-monetary new value was introduced several
times, and the House engaged in “extensive hearings” on the proposed
bills.136 Certainly the Committee did not intend to allow non-monetary new
value contributions, but reject the more important monetary contributions
often necessary to achieve reorganization, that were understood by many to
be already sanctioned by Los Angeles Lumber. Therefore, a ruling that
focuses on the legislative history would likely be quite effective in
reaffirming Congress’s purpose in making the changes that it wanted and
leaving out those it did not desire. In addition, while the question of
whether Los Angeles Lumber firmly established new value can be debated,
what is not in question is that there was no Supreme Court analogue
approving of gifting prior to the enactment of the Code. Using these lines
of reasoning, the Court could effectively affirm the Second Circuit on
somewhat different grounds without calling into question firmly entrenched
doctrine.
Should the Court take a gifting case, it may also have the choice
between limiting its holding to the Chapter 11 cases, or issuing a broad
ruling that would also cover Chapter 7. Although the legislative history
leading up to the enactment of Section 1129 would not work to strike down
gifting in a Chapter 7 scenario, if the holding restricts the practice of
gifting, it is difficult to articulate a policy or statutory rationale why gifting
in Chapter 7 should be permitted. Courts should have the same reasons to
be wary of abuse by junior classes in Chapter 7 proceedings that exist in
134. See Markell, supra note 117, at 88-89 nn.116, 117 (citing Bankruptcy Commission
of the United States, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, H.R. Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
135. Id.
136. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 446-47.
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Chapter 11. Further, there is nothing in the Chapter 7 distribution scheme
statute to indicate that it was meant to be more malleable or less absolute
than Section 1129.
In formulating a rule for ascertaining the plain meaning of provisions
in the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court would also do well to be wary
of grounding a holding on “plain meaning” in any sense that does not
involve legislative history. Such a holding would be likely to be used in
the lower courts to attempt to chip away at the new value line of cases.
C. What the Holding Likely Would Be
In a recent and instructive case, the Supreme Court held in favor of a
narrow reading of the Bankruptcy Code by a 9-0 vote in Milavetz, Gallop
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.137 The Milavetz Court declined an
invitation to take a creative view of several provisions of the portion of the
Bankruptcy Code at issue before it.138 In another recent Supreme Court
decision applying the Bankruptcy Code, Marrama v. Citizens Bank,139 the
Court decided by a 5-4 vote that a bad-faith exception could be implied into
Section 1307(c), allowing dismissal of a bankruptcy filing for pre-petition
bad-faith conduct.140 This is notwithstanding the fact that the statute
mentions ten causes justifying that relief, none of which is prepetition bad
faith conduct.141 The four dissenters, led by Justice Alito, would have
followed the plain language of the statute and would not have implied a
bad-faith exception, holding that a bankruptcy court’s “general and
equitable powers ‘must and can only be exercised within the confines of
the Bankruptcy Code.’”142 While it might seem that this case would imply
that the Court is open to reading language into the Code on policy grounds,
I would posit that the case against gifting is an easier case to make based on
plain language, and for that reason the same four dissenters, all of whom
are still on the Court, would find that gifting is not implied in Section
1129(b), and would be joined by at least one other justice, due to the fact
that it is a clearer case.143
137. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
138. See id. at 1331-32 (explaining how the Court arrived at its definition of the term
“debt relief agency”).
139. Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365 (2007).
140. Id. at 371.
141. Id. at 373.
142. Id. at 382 (Alito, J. Dissenting) (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).
143. It is recognized by the author that based on their judicial philosophies, some of the
four justices in the Marrama dissent, most notably Justice Scalia, would be unlikely to join
an opinion relying on legislative history, as proposed in part B of this section. Another
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CONCLUSION
Whether the Supreme Court would be inclined to hold in favor of
gifting, however, does not answer the question of whether a narrow
interpretation of the absolute priority rule is necessary to prevent the evils
that the Boyd Court was concerned with nearly a century ago. The railroad
reorganizations of that time involved an enormous part of the nation’s
economy. By 1915, approximately half of the nation’s railroads had
defaulted on their debt.144 As of 1906, twelve billion of eighteen billion
dollars in outstanding railroad securities were held by the public.145 The
most efficient method of reorganizing came to be the equity receivership.146
Bondholders and shareholders would work together—or collude,
depending on one’s viewpoint on this kind of collaboration—to reorganize.
In essence, the bondholders were often able to have their own claims
satisfied, squeeze out unsecured creditors so they would receive nothing,
and shareholders would receive new equity for a fraction of its actual
value.147 Looking at the developments leading up to Boyd from this
perspective, it is unsurprising that the Court determined the need for a
“fixed principle.” While the recent practice of gifting is probably not
authorized under the existing Bankruptcy Code, a Supreme Court ruling
handing down a definitive answer to that question will provide needed
clarification for bankruptcy advisors. Perhaps bankruptcy attorneys will
find efficient ways to achieve reorganizations without the option of gifting.
Or, a consensus might develop that gifting in limited circumstances does
add value systemically, and the proper safeguards can be effectively
applied to prevent the type of abuse prevalent in the Boyd era. In that
instance, perhaps a legislative approach would be the best solution.

recent Supreme Court case interpreting the Bankruptcy Code is RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, where the Court held in an 8-0 decision that Section
1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code should not be read in a manner that is “hyperliteral and contrary
to common sense.” 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012). While not related in any substantive
manner, this recent opinion may also be instructive on the potential outcome of a gifting
decision. While a case could be made that it would take a similar “hyperliteral,” aggressive
texualist interpretation of the Code to invalidate the new value doctrine, gifting would be
much easier to invalidate under a traditional plain-language approach. For further
discussion of the RadLAX decision, see Ralph Brubaker, Credit Bidding and the Secured
Creditor’s Baseline Distributional Entitlement in Chapter 11, 32 No. 7 BANKR. LAW LETTER
1 (July 2012).
144. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE & ORGANIZATION 374 (1915).
145. Id. at 62-63.
146. See Markell, supra note 117, at 75 (explaining the efficiency of the equity
receivership for railroads).
147. See Swaine, supra note 7, at 914-17 (detailing the process by which reorganization
occurs in this manner).
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Nothing would prevent the bar from lobbying for an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly permitting gifting in certain circumstances and
with certain stipulations, perhaps similar stipulations to those proposed
leading up to the enactment of the 1978 Code. This approach would be
preferable to the confusing web of cases that are presently on the books as
controlling law.

